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By Justin Clune*
Abstract: The European energy sector is a fragile framework that requires foreign
imports to support domestic production. Natural gas and petroleum imports from
Russia are crucial to the vitality of the European Union’s economy. This Note
addresses both the attempts made to secure the future of these imports as well as the
mitigating factors that have occurred recently that have threatened the flow of trade.
Assessing the legal challenges brought against Russian energy companies, expansion
of the Russian natural gas trade to China, and the upheaval in Ukraine, this Note
looks at the strategic interests in play and how the European Union and Russia have
come to such a dramatic standoff. With the end result of many of these issues still
uncertain as of this writing, this Note assesses possible tactics that Russia and the EU
may employ moving forward and the consequences such tactics may have on the
energy trade.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2013, an assessment of the natural gas trade between
the Russian Federation (Russia) and the European Union (the EU) would
have been straightforward. The resource imbalance, unchecked nature of
Russia’s gas giant, Gazprom, and political capital of Russia created a
landscape in which the EU had little room to negotiate for its market or
nonmarket interests. Since then, the EU’s growing worry over Russia’s
inefficient management of its resources, a probe launched by the European
Commissioner for Competition (the Commission), judgments in European
courts regarding Russia’s handling of the Yukos Oil Company, and political
upheaval in Eastern Europe have radically reshaped the landscape for the
natural gas trade, thereby threatening Russia’s bargaining advantage when
dealing with its western neighbors. In the wake of such changes, the pieces
of which are shifting daily, this Comment will examine (1) the situation as
it existed in the summer of 2013; (2) the major developments in the shifting
political, economic, and trade patterns of the last year; and (3) Russia and
the EU’s future prospects with regard to this trade.
II. THE EUROPEAN ENERGY LANDSCAPE AS IT EXISTED
A. The Natural Gas Landscape
The energy landscape involves finding natural resources and
transforming them into usable energy.1 Energy is used in the following
four primary sectors: electricity generation, industrial, transportation, and
residential/commercial.2 Current EU member states used 3,094 terawatt
hours of electricity in 2011.3 In the industrial sector, EU Member States
consumed, in megatonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe), 291.59 Mtoe in 2010.4
In the transportation sector, the EU member states used 365.22 Mtoe.5 In
the residential/commercial sector, Europe as a continent used 23 million
British thermal units (BTUs) per person, a figure that is expected to slowly

1
FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 4 (Univ. Casebook
Series, 3d ed. 2010).
2
EXXONMOBIL, THE OUTLOOK FOR ENERGY: A VIEW TO 2040 9 (2013), http://www.globaloil
watch.com/reports/exxonmobil-energy-outlook-2013.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2014).
3
Electric Power Consumption (kWh), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
EG.USE.ELEC.KH (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) (compiled from 2011 data; “Electric Power Consumption
measures the production of power plants and combined heat and power plants less transmission,
distribution, and transformation losses and own use by heat and power plants”).
4
EUROPEAN COMM’N, EU TRANSPORT IN FIGURES 115 (2012), http://ec.europa.eu/ transport/factsfundings/statistics/doc/2012/pocketbook2012.pdf.
5
Id.
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decrease as energy efficiency increases in the future.6 (See table below for
comparative values.)

Energy Consumption in Joules by Sector7
Electricity
1.114E+19
Industrial
1.221E+19
Transportation
1.529E+19
Residential/Commercial (includes electrical
consumption for such industries)
1.232E+19
Energy in the EU comes from solid fuels, particularly coal, oil, gas,
electricity, and renewable energy.8 In 2010, EU member states used 279.97
terawatt hours of solid fuel energy, 617.09 terawatt hours of oil energy,
441.80 terawatt hours of gas energy, 236.53 terawatt hours of nuclear
energy, and 172.14 terawatt hours of renewable energy as computed by
total Gross Inland Consumption.9 (See graph below for comparison).

Given the current emphasis on reducing energy consumption due to
environmental concerns, Europe has oriented its energy policy to cut
consumption in many sectors.10 Reductions in fuel usage can be achieved
6

BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 13.
EUROPEAN COMM’N, EU TRANSPORT, supra note 4, at 115; U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Unit Conversion
Factors, SOCIETY OF PETROLEUM ENGINEERS (2001), http://www.spe.org/industry/unit-conversionfactors.php.
8
EUROPEAN COMM’N, EU TRANSPORT, supra note 4, at 111, 115.
9
Id. at 115. Consumption by percentage equates to 16% solid fuel energy, 35.3% oil energy, 25.3%
gas energy, 13.5% nuclear energy, and 10% renewable energy consumption. Id.
10
See Energy Efficient Europe, EUROPEAN COMM’N (June 22, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/
7
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through greater efficiency,11 reduction in waste, and decreased consumer
demand.
Russia is the natural source of fuel production for the EU because it
has the largest proven supply of natural gas reserves.12 In contrast, the EU
member states have much lower natural gas production, and such
production has been steadily declining due to exhaustion of natural
resources and uneconomical potential for production.13 The EU imports
approximately 64% of its natural gas, a percentage that is expected to grow
in the foreseeable future.14 In 2012, Russia accounted for 34% of the EU’s
natural gas imports and about one quarter of its total supply.15
Russia’s success in natural gas export depends, in large part, on the
security of its pipeline transmission system. With notable exceptions,
almost all existing operational pipelines run through either Ukraine or
Belarus, two former republics of the Soviet Union that became independent
in 1991.16 Currently, pipelines flowing from Russia through Ukraine have a
capacity of 142 billion cubic metres (bcm) while pipelines from Russia
through Belarus have a capacity of 38 bcm.17 Russia’s main export
competitors for the EU market are Norway, Algeria, Qatar, and Central
Asia, although the United States is poised to potentially become a player in
the market as transmission technology is developed to facilitate
transportation.18 Ultimately, non-European competitors must first secure
transmission access to the EU to increase their energy exports to the EU.
In 2012, Gazprom, the largest exporter of Russian natural gas and the
subject of imminent legal action by the Commission, produced 74.4% of
Russia’s natural gas supply and 13.6% of worldwide natural gas supply.19
Gazprom exports about half of its 7.1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas to EU
member states, with the remaining exports going to former Soviet states,

news/energy/110622_en.htm.
11
See Lorna A. Greening et al., Energy Efficiency and Consumption – The Rebound Effect – A
Survey, 28 ENERGY POL’Y 389 (2000).
12
Keith Kohl, OPEC and Russia‘s Greatest Fear: Losing Their Energy Weapon, ENERGY &
CAPITAL (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.energyandcapital.com/articles/opec-russia-fear/1450.
13
Eurostat, Energy Production and Imports, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
statistics_explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports (last modified Sept. 5, 2014).
14
MICHAEL RATNER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42405, EUROPE’S ENERGY SECURITY:
OPTIONS AND CHALLENGES TO NATURAL GAS SUPPLY DIVERSIFICATION 5 (2013), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42405.pdf. The EU Commission forecasts 80% of natural gas
consumption in Europe will be imported in 2030. Id.
15
Id. at 6.
16
Major Gas Pipelines of the Former Soviet Union and Capacity of Export Pipelines, E. EUROPEAN
GAS ANALYSIS, http://www.eegas.com/fsu.htm#Tab (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
17
Id.
18
RATNER, supra note 14, at 2–4, 6.
19
GAZPROM, GAZPROM IN FIGURES 2008-2012 FACTBOOK 3 (2013), available at
http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/55/477129/gazprom-reference-figures-2008-2012-eng.pdf.
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Turkey, and other small import markets.20 While Russia hopes to
eventually diversify its exports to include burgeoning markets in Asia,21 it
is currently very dependent on natural gas revenues from the EU; similarly,
the EU is very dependent on Russia’s natural gas supply.
The positions of Belarus and Ukraine towards Russian natural gas
pipelines have posed political and economic advantages and risks to the
Russian natural gas export industry. Belarus is a former Soviet state with
strong ties to Russia.22 Russia and Belarus codified their united interests in
the 1999 signing of the Agreement on Establishment of a Union State of
Belarus and Russia, which established a supranational entity consisting of
only Russia and Belarus.23 Ukraine, also a former Soviet state, has a
population that is divided between its western half⎯pro-European,
Ukrainian speaking, tourism and agrarian driven⎯and its eastern
half⎯pro-Russian, Russian speaking, and industrial.24 This tension has
birthed a transformative political discussion that includes radical statements
by Russian President Vladimir Putin (e.g., Ukrainian accession to the
World Trade Organization could provide a platform for Russian annexation
of eastern Ukraine).25 Ultimately, the stability of Belarus and Ukraine and
the susceptibility of those nations to Russian influence are of critical
importance to Russian export dominance in the EU energy market, as these
nations control the transmission of energy to the EU.
In relation to the natural gas trade, Russia has categorized former
Soviet states on its borders, including Belarus and Ukraine, as part of
Russia’s “sphere of privileged interest.”26 Russia has used its dominant
energy position and existing transmission infrastructure to its political and
economic gain with regard to this sphere. For instance, Russia provided
Ukraine a two-thirds discount on natural gas prices for ten years in
exchange for a renegotiation of the withdrawal of Russian Black Sea fleet
20

RATNER, supra note 14, at 9.
Id. at 11; see Elena Mazneva, Gazprom Says China Natural Gas Deal Delayed to Putin’s May
Visit, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-22/gazprom-says-chinanatural-gas-deal-delayed-to-putin-s-may-visit.html (discussing Gazprom’s failure to close a 30-year
natural gas contract with China, but optimistically predicting that the deal will be closed in 2014).
22
See Helena Yakovlev Golani, Two Decades of the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy in the
Commonwealth of Independent States: The Cases of Belarus and Ukraine (European Forum at the
Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem, Working Paper, 2011), available at http://www.ef.huji.ac.il/publications/
Yakovlev%20Golani.pdf.
23
Russia and Union State, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS,
http://www.mfa.gov.by/en/courtiers/russia/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
24
See Stephen Mulvey, Analysis: Divided Ukraine, BBC NEWS (Nov. 25, 2004),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4043315.stm.
25
Юрий Стець, Impyerskiye Komplyeksy Brat’yev Rossiyan ili Nye Mechitye Bisyev pyeryed
Svin’yami [The Imperial Complexes of Our Russian Brothers or Don’t Throw Pearls Before Pigs],
UKRAINSKAYA PRAVDA (July 3, 2008), http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2008/07/3/ 3482506/ (Ukr.).
26
RATNER, supra note 14, at 11.
21
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in formerly Ukrainian Crimea from the original withdrawal date of 2017 to
one in 2042.27
However, despite Russia’s strong ties to and economic codependence
on its eastern Slavic-speaking neighbors, the transmission of natural gas
from Russia to the EU has undergone notable periods of crisis when
relations were frayed between Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. In 2005, for
example, Russia accused Ukraine of domestically using gas that was
intended for the EU without actually paying for it.28 In response, Gazprom
froze exports of natural gas through the Ukrainian pipelines, which caused
shortages in the EU member states that depend on the gas, until Ukraine
and Russia could agree on a new deal.29 Similar reductions occurred in
2009 over alleged debts owed by Ukraine to Gazprom.30 While tensions
have continued to simmer intermittently between Russia and Ukraine, the
replacement of pro-Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, born in
Ukrainian-speaking Sumy Oblast,31 with pro-Russian President Viktor
Yanukovych, born in the Russian-speaking industrial center Donetsk
Oblast,32 reoriented Ukrainian policy with regard to Russia. In 2007,
Belarus also underwent problems relating to the oil pipeline, Druzhba,
when Russia accused Belarus of siphoning oil marked for EU
consumption.33
B. The Petroleum Landscape
While only Russia’s state-controlled natural gas supplier, Gazprom, is
implicated in the current antitrust investigation by the EU, Russia and the
EU have a similarly codependent relationship with regard to petroleum
imports. The EU has extremely limited oil reserves, which comprise less
than 9% of its total crude oil supply.34 Therefore, the EU must import a

27

Id. at 11–12.
Ukraine ‘Stealing Europe’s Gas,’ BBC NEWS (Jan. 2, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/europe/4574630.stm.
29
Miriam Elder, Behind the Russia-Ukraine Gas Conflict, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 3, 2009),
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jan2009/gb2009013_045451.htm.
30
Id.
31
Profile: Viktor Yushchenko, BBC NEWS (Jan. 13, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/
4035789.stm.
32
Stuart Williams, Ukraine’s ‘Orange Villain’ Seeks Last Laugh, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 12, 2010),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/6973451/Ukraines-Orange-villain-seeks-last-laugh.html.
33
Russia Oil Row Hits Europe Supply, BBC NEWS (Jan. 8, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/business/6240473.stm.
34
Registration of Crude Oil Imports and Deliveries in the European Union, EUROPEAN COMM’N
(2012), http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/oil/import_export_en.htm (accessed by downloading
“Monthly and Cumulated Crude Oil Imports (Volumes and Prices) by EU and Non EU Country” and
opening file “eu-coi-2011-01-12”).
28
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large majority of its crude oil supply.35 The EU imports about 27.95% of
its crude oil supply from Russia, the majority of which comes from the
Urals.36 Like the natural gas market, the oil market in Russia is dominated
by a single state-controlled company, Transneft, which transports 90% of
the oil produced in Russia.37 Transneft is even less privatized than
Gazprom; the Russian government holds 78.1% of Transneft shares38 as
opposed to over 50% of Gazprom’s shares.39 Russia’s oil pipelines to the
EU also traverse Ukraine and Belarus in the same way that its natural gas
pipelines do; therefore, these pipelines present similar risks to the oil export
industry.
C. EU Domestic Supplies
In 2007, the Commission published an “Energy Policy for Europe”
that proposed the radical integration and regulatory control of EU member
states’ energy-production industries to increase efficiency and stymie the
growing dependence on energy imports.40 In 2010, renewable energy
accounted for about 12.4% of EU member states’ final energy
consumption41 despite repeated efforts to promote immediate and
significant growth in energy production using renewables.42 Renewable
sources of energy include biomass, hydro, wind, solar, and geothermal
power.43
Domestically produced nuclear power accounts for approximately
30% of all electricity generated in the EU.44 Nuclear power in the EU is
governed by the Euratom Treaty, which sets high standards to ensure
35
EU Crude Oil Imports, EUROPEAN COMM’N (2012), http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/
oil/import_export_en.htm.
36
EUROPEAN COMM’N, Registration of Crude Oil Imports, supra note 34.
37
Company, TRANSNEFT, http://en.transneft.ru/company/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
38
Update 2-Russia to Reduce Transneft Stake in 2014, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/18/russia-transneft-results-idUSL5N0D515B20130418 (stating
that Russia intends to reduce its ownership share to as low as 75% in the near future).
39
Shares, GAZPROM, http://www.gazprom.com/investors/stock/ (last updated May 8, 2014).
40
Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament: An
Energy Policy for Europe, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Jan. 10, 2007), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0001&from=EN.
41
The Contribution of Renewable Energy Up to 12.4% of Energy Consumption in the EU27 in 2010,
COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS. (June 18, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STAT-1294_en.htm.
42
See EU Renewable Energy Policy, EURACTIV (Aug. 2, 2007), http://www.euractiv.com/energy/
eu-renewable-energy-policy/article-117536 (setting a goal of 20% of energy production based on
renewables).
43
See Dawn Stover, The Myth of Renewable Energy, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Nov.
22, 2011), http://thebulletin.org/myth-renewable-energy.
44
Nuclear Energy, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/nuclear-energy
(last visited Jan. 27, 2015).
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nuclear power remains a safe, clean source of power for EU member
states.45 However, budget problems have stemmed a rapid shift towards
nuclear power in the EU as the mammoth overhead costs of reactor
construction have cut the legs out from under even the best planned
projects.46 Moreover, in reaction to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
disaster47 that has caused immense political, economic, and environmental
problems for Japan since 2011, Germany has implemented a policy that
involves immediate shutdown of several reactors and a planned exit from
the nuclear energy sector by 2022.48 France, one of the world leaders in
nuclear power production, elected Francois Hollande as its President in
2012 on a campaign promise to reduce nuclear energy production in France
by up to a third by 2025.49 Finally, some EU economic powerhouses, such
as Spain and Italy, are committed to permanent avoidance of nuclear
power.50
Overall, as February 2013 drew to a close, the energy relationship
between Russia and the EU was, in a word, stable. Russian state energy
providers Gazprom and Transneft had dominant market positions that
seemed unlikely to be challenged by competitors in any significant way.
While the business practices of these companies remained troublesome to
EU market regulators, the EU did not possess any leverage to challenge
Russia in an appreciable manner. The EU also did not possess a forum to
address its concerns in a binding manner, and it appeared unlikely that the
EU would be able to exert sufficient pressure to influence anything more
than superficial change to Russian business practices.

45
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,
OFFICIAL J. EUR. UNION (Mar. 30, 2010), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:084:0001:0112:EN:PDF.
46
James Kanter, In Finland, Nuclear Renaissance Runs into Trouble, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/29/business/energy-environment/29nuke.html?ref=globalhome&_r=0.
47
Fukushima Accident, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N (Sept. 2014), http://www.world-nuclear.org/
info/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-accident/. On March 11, 2011, a major earthquake
struck near Japan and triggered a tsunami, which disabled the power supply and cooling for three
reactors at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi power plant, thereby resulting in the meltdown of those three
cores. The efforts to contain radiation in the area and the resulting evacuations were largely covered in
the news for the next few years.
48
Annika Breidthardt, German Government Wants Nuclear Exit by 2022 at Latest, REUTERS (May
30, 2011), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/05/30/us-germany-nuclear-idUKTRE74Q2P120110530.
49
Henry Sokolski, Nuclear Power Goes Rogue, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 28, 2011),
http://mag.newsweek.com/2011/11/27/post-fukushima-nuclear-power-changes-latitudes.html.
50
Id.
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III. CHANGING MARKETS
A. The Roadmap EU–Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050
In March 2013, Russia and the Commission signed the most
comprehensive energy-roadmap agreement ever coordinated between the
parties: the Roadmap EU–Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050 (Roadmap
Agreement).51 The Roadmap Agreement memorialized the parties’ intent
to work towards a pan-European energy space by 2050,52 which would
provide Russia with market security within European energy markets while
simultaneously addressing the EU’s goal of bringing Russian companies in
line with the EU’s business standards.53 The structure of the Roadmap
Agreement speaks to the following areas in which the EU focused its
pressure to influence reform of the Russian energy providers: (1) building a
functioning, integrated network infrastructure; (2) establishing open,
transparent, efficient, and competitive markets; (3) ensuring energy
security; and (4) conforming to the goals of sustainable development.54
1. Functioning, Integrated Network Infrastructure
The development of a functioning, integrated network infrastructure as
the first tenet of EU–Russian energy relations reflects the EU’s concern
with the reliability and security of energy trade.55 An integrated EU energy
network is one that allows for maximum utilization of domestic energy
sources, including renewables, sufficient interconnections to reach new EU
member states, a smart grid to ensure maximum energy efficiency, and
sufficient storage or reverse flow options to get energy where it needs to
go.56 With regard to all aspects of energy trade between Russia and the EU,
particularly with respect to natural gas transmission by Gazprom, the
Roadmap Agreement pushes for greater integration of energy grids and an
increase in the channels of transmission from Russia to the EU.57 The
Roadmap Agreement identifies several risks to be mitigated involving
supply and demand, including (1) anticipating the peaks and troughs of the
51
Roadmap EU–Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Mar. 2013), available
at https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2013_03_eu_russia_roadmap_2050_signed.pdf.
52
Id. at 5.
53
Id. at 10–11.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 6.
56
Priorities for 2020 and Beyond — A Blueprint for an Integrated European Energy Network,
EUROPEAN COMM’N 2–3 (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0677:FIN:EN:PDF.
57
Roadmap EU–Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050, supra note 51, at 10.
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EU’s gas demand, (2) ensuring stable, secure, and consistent transmission
through existing and proposed pipeline connections, and (3) coordinating
the energy infrastructures of member states to be compatible with Russian
gas export infrastructure.58
The EU, however, hedges its promises in the Roadmap Agreement by
leaving itself room to grow its energy markets away from dependence on
Russian gas and oil if the energy market and technological developments
make it possible. For instance, the EU explicitly contemplates reduced gas
demand consistent with its promotion of domestic energy production,
including renewables and nuclear power.59 Moreover, the Roadmap
Agreement highlights political problems that may not have been foreseen or
contemplated, such as the differing market frameworks and policy
considerations with regard to EU member states.60 Under the Roadmap
Agreement, such considerations would be resolved by preexisting and
contemplated supranational organizations and forums.61
However, such strategies have historically been insufficient to resolve
disputes. In 1994, several former Soviet states and current and future EU
member states negotiated the Energy Charter Treaty (the Treaty), which
provided strict standards on energy trade between eastern and Western
Europe, including Article 27, which outlined a dispute arbitration
mechanism to deal with conflicts between states or energy companies
within different states.62 While Russia was instrumental in negotiating the
Treaty, it failed to ratify the Treaty, and in 2009 Russia ceased to be bound
by it.63 Following this withdrawal, it became increasingly difficult for EU
member states to initiate legal action against Gazprom or Transneft for
activities after 2009.64 Just as the enforcement and dispute resolution
mechanisms are soft on Russia, the promises of the EU provide only
superficial assurances to Russian natural gas producers. For instance, the
EU’s main commitment with regard to guaranteed demand for Russia’s
natural gas supply is a promise by the EU to provide Russia with access to
all official forward-looking natural gas demand assessments.65 Overall,
neither side is willing to make the strong assurances necessary to institute a
functioning, integrated network that would solve the long-term issues in the
58

Id. at 13–14.
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 15.
62
Energy Charter Secretariat, The Energy Charter Treaty and Related Documents, ENERGY CHARTER
(Sept. 2004), available at http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document /EN.pdf.
63
FAQ, ENERGY CHARTER, http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=18 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013)
(accessed by clicking the link, “What is Russia‘s status with the Energy Charter?”).
64
Keith C. Smith, Bringing Energy Security to East Central Europe: Regional Cooperation is the
Key 4, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES (Apr. 2010), available at http://csis.org/files/
publication/100402_Smith_BringingEnergySecurity_Web.pdf.
65
Roadmap EU–Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050, supra note 51, at 15.
59

209

CLUNE (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

3/12/15 7:46 AM

35:199 (2014)

gas trade.
2. Open, Transparent, Efficient, and Competitive Markets
The Roadmap Agreement’s commitment to open, transparent,
efficient, and competitive markets presents the most significant challenge to
the status quo energy relationship between the EU and Russia. Russia’s
natural gas and oil markets are dominated by single, state-controlled
entities, and while upstart private Russian competitors have begun to
increase their market shares,66 they do not possess sufficient market power
to displace Gazprom and Transneft from their dominant market positions.
With regard to open markets, as articulated in the “2050 goal” of full
integration of Russian and EU energy networks, potential challenges loom
based on the historical animosity between Eastern and Western Europe.
For instance, Kosovo is widely regarded as a potential candidate for
eventual EU membership.67 But Kosovo, which in 2008 unilaterally
declared its independence68 from Serbia, an official EU candidate for
membership,69 is not currently recognized as a sovereign state by Russia.70
Kosovo is not currently linked to any oil or gas pipelines and must rely on
imports by rail or truck, primarily from Macedonia, for its supply.71 If
Kosove accedes to the EU as part of the Roadmap Agreement, Gazprom in
support of Serbian interests may be hesitant to link Kosovo to the EU
energy network. As exemplified in the situations involving Belarus and
Ukraine, Russia is not afraid to use its position as a dominant supplier to
exercise political influence.
Transparency has long been an issue in EU–Russian energy trade.72
The Russian energy industry exhibits significant problems with cartel
management whereby governmental leaders, intelligence officials, and
favored business oligarchs craft corporate energy policy alongside Russian
government policymakers to maximize wealth and buy support from
66

Id. at 13.
Kosovo, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-countryinformation/kosovo/ (last updated June 27, 2013).
68
Kosovo Declaration of Independence, REPUB. OF KOS. ASSEMB. (Feb. 17, 2008),
http://www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635.
69
Serbia, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-info
rmation/serbia/ (last updated June 27, 2013).
70
Giorgio Comai, Moscow’s Approach Towards De Facto States After Kosovo‘s Recognition,
OSSERVATORIO BALCANI E CAUCASO (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Regions-andcountries/Russia/Moscow-s-approach-towards-de-facto-states-after-Kosovo-s-recognition-140382.
71
Energy Regulatory Office, Statement of Security of Supply for Kosovo, ELEC. NATURAL GAS &
OIL 28, 33 (July 2011), available at http://www.energy-community.org/ pls/portal/docs/1218181.PDF.
72
See Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (2012), http://cpi.transparency
.org/cpi2012/results/ (showing that Russia is ranked number 133 in the world in corruption, while
Belarus and Ukraine, the main transmission intermediaries, are ranked 123 and 144 respectively).
67
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western leaders.73 The lack of legal reporting or impartial court systems to
enforce contractual obligations presents further risks to EU policymakers
considering opening energy relationships with Russia.74 While many newly
acceded EU member states are struggling to end corrupt business practices,
Russia’s energy markets have become more corrupt over time.75
Russia’s economy has a longstanding practice of bribery, which can be
an intolerable danger to western companies predicated on a transparent and
ethically regulated market.76 This norm in Russian business practice can
cause problems for international companies that might face domestic
liability for corrupt business practices abroad.77 With energy cartels
amassing influence at every strata of the Russian political system,78
building an energy market that conforms to western standards of
transparency may prove insurmountable in the Russian energy sector.
While such corrupt business practices have long been linked to companies
like Gazprom,79 the EU expresses its resolve with regard to enforcing
anticorruption measures for overt corrupt business practices as well as
bribery and other more clandestine forms of corruption.80 As the EU moves
closer to acceptance of principles of corporate social responsibility such as
the ten principles of the UN Global Compact,81 Gazprom and Transneft
73

Keith C. Smith, Lack of Transparency in Russian Energy Trade: The Risks to Europe 1-2, CTR.
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES (July 2010), available at http://csis.org/files/publication/
100702_Smith_LackOfTransparency_Web.pdf.
74
Id.
75
See Margarita M. Balmaceda, Filling a Gap, Filling a Pocket: Absent Institutions, Intermediary
Companies, and Energy Dependency in the Post-Soviet World (May 2008) (unpublished paper), available at
http://www.ii.umich.edu/UMICH/ceseuc/Home/ACADEMICS/Research%20Projects/Energy%20Security%
20in%20Europe%20and%20Eurasia/Balmaceda.pdf.
76
Michael Scott, Russia Corruption “May Force Western Firms to Quit,” REUTERS (Mar. 15,
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/15/us-russia-corruption-idUSTRE62E1SU20100315.
77
Smith, supra note 73, at 2–3; see also Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions art. 4, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (imposing a duty on signatory states to criminalize the
bribery of public officials both for offenses that occur within that state and for offenses committed by
their citizens abroad).
78
See, e.g., Cynthia A. Roberts, Russia and the European Union: The Sources and Limits of
“Special Relationships,” STRATEGIC STUDIES INST. (Feb. 2007), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.
army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=761. “Russia’s autocrats and dominant elites who gain phenomenal
wealth from their positions of power have a stake in a nontransparent, illiberal Russian state and eschew
international agreements requiring strict conditionality and accountability.”
79
Smith, supra note 73, at 2–5. “[T]hroughout the eight years of Vladimir Putin’s presidency,
Russia’s state-owned natural gas monopoly Gazprom and its subsidiaries Gazpromexport and
Gazprombank systematically created an elaborate web of opaque companies throughout Europe and
Russia acting in league with various European partners. . . . The companies are also believed to be
linked to Russian and other organized crime groups.”
80
See id. at 10–11.
81
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/
policies/sustainable-business/corporate-social-responsibility/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
FOR
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clearly lag behind in the area of anticorruption and environmental
responsibility.82
Energy efficiency is crucial to maintaining a supply of natural gas that
can serve both Russia’s increasing domestic needs as well as the increasing
export demand to the EU and potential new markets in Asia.83 In this way,
a strong cooperative partnership between Russia and the EU benefits both
parties. The EU desires Russian energy efficiency to ensure an adequate
supply that meets its energy consumption needs without driving up prices,
and Russia will profit in the long term if it can reduce natural gas waste due
to flaring84 and grow its energy revenues by maximizing energy production
from its current rate of harvesting.
3. Energy Security
Energy security for the EU means uninterrupted access to energy
sources at an affordable price.85 Since the EU is a major net importer of
fuel sources, energy security depends in large part on the dependability of
the EU’s imports.86 For natural gas, energy security involves having import
channels from multiple nations, increased storage capacity, and sufficient
pipeline capacity.87 With a history of conflicts affecting the gas supply
running through Belarus and Ukraine, energy security has been historically
low. However, looking forward, both Russia and the EU have a mutual
interest in increasing pipeline transmission, including through countries
other than Belarus and Ukraine. Meanwhile, the EU has an interest in
diversifying the countries from which it imports gas by building pipeline
transmission to Europe or encouraging Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
imports.88

82
See The Ten Principles, UN GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/abouttheGC/
TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2014). “Principle 7: Businesses should support a
precautionary approach to environmental challenges; Principle 8: undertake initiatives to promote
greater environmental responsibility; and Principle 9: encourage the development and diffusion of
environmentally friendly technologies. Principle 10: Businesses should work against corruption in all
its forms, including extortion and bribery.” Id.
83
GEVORG SARGSYAN ET AL., INT’L FIN. CORP. & WORLD BANK, ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN RUSSIA:
UNTAPPED RESERVES 17 (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/ connect/de1e58804
aababd79797d79e0dc67fc6/IFC+EE+in+Russia+Untapped+Potential.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (noting that
even under the current framework of supply and demand for Russian natural gas, the excess of demand
will still create increasing shortfalls).
84
Id. at 19.
85
In-Depth Study of European Energy Security, at 3, COM (2014) 330 final (July 2, 2014), available
at https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/20140528_energy_security_study_0.pdf.
86
Id. at 5.
87
Id. at 8–9.
88
Id. at 9.
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4. Sustainable Development
The Commission defines sustainable development as “meeting the
needs of the present generation without jeopardizing the ability of future[]
generations to meet their own needs – in other words a better quality of life
for everyone, now and for generations to come.”89
Sustainable
development typically entails policies that minimize climate change and
promote low carbon emissions.90 The EU has recently been a prime
destination for exports of coal from the United States, a fuel source that
poses among the most severe climate effects91 as well as immediate health
hazards to human life.92 However, the EU’s push towards renewables is
intended to stimulate a decrease in demand for coal in the EU starting
immediately.93
The EU has sought to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions created by
coal as an alternative fuel source to gas and in March 2013 issued an
official communication signaling the EU’s support for Carbon Capture and
Storage (CCS) technology.94 Implementing CCS on existing and future
coal-fired power plants would greatly increase the monetary cost of coal as
a fuel source.95
Natural gas, while not as environmentally friendly as renewable fuel
sources, has 60% fewer greenhouse gas emissions than coal in electricity
generation.96 Gazprom has responded to the EU’s demands for more
sustainable energy growth by positioning natural gas as the most suitable
fuel source to be used in conjunction with a shift to a greater use of
renewables.97 The report, Making the Green Journey Work, specifically
89
Sustainable Development, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd/ (last updated
July 5, 2013).
90
Id.
91
Coal, GREENPEACE, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/climate-change/coal/
(last visited Nov. 21, 2013).
92
Justin Guay, U.S. Coal Exports Causing Deaths in Europe, SIERRA CLUB (June 14, 2013),
http://sierraclub.typepad.com/compass/2013/06/us-coal-exports-causing-deaths-in-europe.html.
93
John McGarrity, Analysis: EU Coal Demand Starting Decades-Long Slide, R EUTERS
(Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/30/us-coal-demand-europe-analysis-i
dUSBRE97T0K120130830.
94
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Future of Carbon Capture
and Storage in Europe, COM (2013) 180 final (Mar. 27, 2013), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0180:FIN:EN:PDF.
95
Carbon Capture and Geological Storage, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/
policies/lowcarbon/ccs/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
96
Flipbook, GASNATURALLY, http://www.gasnaturally.eu/ebook/gasnaturallybrochureupdate/index.
html (last updated Oct. 2012).
97
Our Perspectives, GAZPROM, http://www.gazprom-mt.com/WhatWeSay/OurPerspectives/Pages/
Making-the-Green-Journey-Work.aspx (last visited Nov. 22, 2013); see also EUROPEAN GAS
ADVOCACY FORUM, THE FUTURE ROLE OF NATURAL GAS (2011); EUROPEAN GAS ADVOCACY FORUM,
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assesses how the use of natural gas alongside renewable development
would allow Europe to reach each of its sustainable development goals
through 2050.98
While the Roadmap Agreement offers plans, suggestions, and a
convenient forum for discussion of the Russian–EU energy trade, its overall
effect is similar to soft law. Without an enforcement mechanism to protect
EU from Gazprom and Transneft’s corporate practices, the EU remains
powerless to effect real change on Russia’s energy companies. Seven
months after this Roadmap Agreement was signed, the Commission found
that enforcement mechanism to hold Gazprom legally accountable for its
noncompliance with EU business regulations.
B. The Commission Probe into Gazprom
On October 3, 2013 in Vilnius, Lithuania, European Commissioner for
Competition Joaquin Almunia announced that the EU was prepared to
formally charge the Russian state-controlled99 natural gas company,
Gazprom, with abusing its dominant position in Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia.100
The antitrust charges, which are expected to be resolved by the spring of
2014,101 stem from investigations begun in 2012102 and could result in fines
of up to 10% of Gazprom’s annual revenue,103 or $15 billion dollars.104
The EU is built on a capitalist market system whereby competing
suppliers drive down prices for consumer benefit, and government
involvement is relegated to regulatory policy for the protection of
consumers.105 This market structure is incompatible with Gazprom and

MAKING THE GREEN JOURNEY WORK (2011).
98
EUROPEAN GAS ADVOCACY FORUM, MAKING THE GREEN JOURNEY WORK 1 (2011).
99
Shares, GAZPROM, http://www.gazprom.com/investors/stock/ (information current as of Dec. 31,
2011).
100
EU to Charge Gazprom in Antitrust Probe, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (Oct. 3, 2013),
http://www.rferl.org/content/gazprom-eu-probe/25125736.html.
101
Nerijus Adomaitis, EU Aims to Complete Gazprom Antitrust Probe by Spring, REUTERS (Nov. 4,
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/04/us-eu-gazprom-probe-idUSBRE9A30AQ 20131104.
102
Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Opens Proceedings Against Gazprom
(Sept. 4, 2012) (on file with the European Comm’n).
103
RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY, supra note 100.
104
Gazprom Faces $15Bln Antitrust Charges from EU, MOSCOW TIMES (Oct. 4, 2013),
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/gazprom-faces-15bln-antitrust-charges-from-eu/
487057.html.
105
See generally Communication to the Spring European Council: Working Together for Growth
and Jobs – A New Start for the Lisbon Treaty, at 8, COM (2005) 24 final (Feb. 2, 2005), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0024:FIN:en:PDF (noting the need
to screen regulatory barriers to competition in the European Union energy market to promote more
healthy competition).
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Transneft’s government-controlled and government-sanctioned monopolies.
Russia actively discourages competitors by directing western businesses
towards Gazprom and Transneft, which are connected to the most elite of
cartels.106 Moreover, Russia’s policy of pricing gas exports on an index of
oil exports allows Gazprom and Transneft to work together to maximize
their market shares.107 This practice is at the center of the ongoing EU
investigation into Gazprom’s anticompetitive actions.108
Anticompetitive practices in the EU’s internal markets are governed
by Title VII, Chapter 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU
(TFEU).109 While Article 101 of the TFEU more or less mirrors the
restrictions of the Sherman Act in U.S. law,110 Article 102, on which this
action is predicated, declares that “any abuse by one or more undertakings
of a dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part of
it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it
may affect trade between the Member States.”111
The European Commission will prepare a statement of objections that
note the anticompetitive practices to which the Commission objects, but it
is already clear that two of the primary objections are Gazprom’s
prohibition on resale of natural gas by European buyers and its unfair
inflation of costs by linking gas prices to oil prices.112
Ideally, Gazprom would prefer to resolve this matter with a
commitment decision⎯an expedited and flexible tool of EU competition
law that allows a legal action to be concluded through a target’s

106

Smith, supra note 73, at 4.
Foo Yun Chee, EU Preparing to Charge Gazprom in Antitrust Case, REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/03/us-eu-gazprom-idUSBRE9920DV20131003.
108
Id.
109
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts. 101–109,
Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN.
110
See Antitrust Overview, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/overview
_en.html (last updated Nov. 21, 2014); 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby is declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”).
111
Antitrust Overview, supra note 110 (noting that such abuse may consist of “(a) directly or
indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting
production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to the acceptance by the other parties of supplementary
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the
subject of such contracts.”).
112
James Kanter & Andrew E. Kramer, Europe Threatens Gazprom with Antitrust Action, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/business/international/europe-threatensgazprom-with-antitrust-action.html.
107
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acquiescence to demands of the Commission.113 Gazprom would likely be
amenable to the terms of a commitment decision with regard to the
prohibitions on resale.114 The Commission alleges that Gazprom included
“destination clauses,” which are contractual prohibitions on resale of gas to
other countries.115 Destination clauses are prohibited when the net effect of
their use creates national submarkets for gas instead of a single EU
market.116 Gazprom has been investigated for market abuses before and has
shown willingness to cancel these clauses, which would be the likely effect
of a commitment letter with regard to this issue.117
The more divisive issue covered in the action against Gazprom will be
the linking of natural gas prices to oil prices in long-term gas contracts. On
June 27, 2013, Gazprom lost an action in an arbitral tribunal against RWE,
a German electric utilities company, regarding whether this long-practiced
method of pricing was allowed.118 Gazprom has extra incentive to avoid an
adverse ruling on this issue because a clear ruling against oil indexation by
a Commission tribunal could have strong persuasive authority not only
throughout Europe, but also in other countries seeking to do business with
Gazprom.119
Besides Gazprom’s natural incentive to avoid significant fines in this
antitrust action, it would be put in a perilous position in the case of an
adverse ruling. Gazprom relies on long-term contracts using “take and pay”
provisions to guarantee enough supply to ensure strong revenues and
leverage pricing power.120 Having such practices deemed illegal may
destabilize Gazprom’s European gas sales model with drastic effects for the
company. Gazprom has explicitly favored a settlement to conclude this
matter throughout this probe.121 As of this time, Gazprom has offered the
113
See Heike Schweitzer, Commitment Decisions in the EU and in the Member States: Functions
and Risks of a New Instrument of Competition Law Enforcement Within a Federal Enforcement Regime,
E-COMPETITIONS BULLETIN (Aug. 2, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101630) (discussing
the growing tendency to end all but the most extreme of cartel cases in a commitment decision).
114
Nicolò Sartori, The European Commission vs. Gazprom: An Issue of Fair Competition or a
Foreign Policy Quarrel? (5 Istituto Affari Internazionali, Working Paper No. 13, 2013).
115
ALAN RILEY, CEPS POLICY BRIEF No. 285, COMMISSION V. GAZPROM: THE ANTITRUST CLASH
OF THE DECADE? 8 (2012).
116
Sartori, supra note 114.
117
See id.
118
Richard Power, RWE v Gazprom Export: Is It Open Season on Contract Price Clauses in Gas
Supply Contracts?, BERWIN LEIGHTON PAISNER (July 16, 2013) http://www.blplaw.com/expert-legalinsights/articles/rwe-v-gazprom-export-is-it-open-season-on-contract-price-clauses-in-gas-supplycontracts/.
119
RILEY, supra note 115, at 9.
120
Id.
121
EU Says Gazprom Not Yet Satisfied Pricing Concerns, MOSCOW TIMES (Feb. 10, 2014),
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/eu-says-gazprom-not-yet-satisfied-pricing-concerns
/494153.html.
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EU price concessions, but they have not yet been accepted by the
Commission.122
Looking forward, such legal instruments could provide the EU with
the necessary leverage to effect tangible reform on the Russian energy
providers. Many of the allegations against Gazprom also apply to
Transneft. Since each member state of the EU could file its own complaint
to the Commission based on a multitude of practices, the Commission could
create a real economic incentive for Russian energy companies to avoid the
worst of its business practices to avoid sanctions by the Commission.
C. Yukos Oil Legal Proceedings and Arbitration
The Gazprom antitrust investigation was not the only legal action
initiated against Russia’s energy interests in the last year. In 2003, Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, the owner of Yukos Oil Company (Yukos), a dominant
player in gas and oil, was arrested on charges of fraud and tax evasion.123
Seen as a move to seize power, Putin’s arrest of one of the wealthiest
oligarchs in the country quieted challenges to Putin’s power from other
wealthy players, most of whom could be charged similarly.124 Following
Khodorkovsky’s arrest, Russia sought to collect on billions of dollars in
allegedly unpaid taxes, thereby ultimately freezing Yukos’s assets and
resulting in Yukos’s sale of its most lucrative assets in an auction.125
Former majority shareholders in Yukos who were led by Leonid
Nevzlin, owner of just over 70% of GML Ltd. (the former majority owner
of Yukos),126 filed a claim based on the Treaty at the Permanent Court of
Arbitration.127 On July 28, 2014, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled
for the claimant shareholders for $50 billion, which was twenty times larger
than any arbitration ruling ever rendered against a government.128 The
122

Id.
Leonid Bershidsky, A $50 Billion Bill for Putin‘s Aggression, BLOOMBERG (July 28, 2014),
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-07-28/a-50-billion-bill-for-putin-s-aggression.
124
Id.
125
Kavaljit Singh, Khodorovsky and the Yukos Oil Saga: The Investor-to-State Arbitration Is Rigged. Why
Russia Should Not Honor Tribunal Award of $51 Billion, GLOBAL RESEARCH (July 29, 2014),
http://www.globalresearch.ca/khodorkovsky-and-the-yukos-oil-saga-the-investor-to-state-arbitration-is-riggedwhy-russia-should-not-honour-tribunal-award-of-51-billion/5393883.
126
Courtney Weaver, Leonid Nevzlin Is Biggest Winner from Yukos Ruling at The Hague,
FINANCIAL TIMES (July 28, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bba18346-1669-11e4-a5c7-00144feab
dc0.html#axzz3C9Q4eSPN.
127
Tim Worstall, Hague Court; Russia Did Steal Yukos and Must Pay $50 Billion Damages,
FORBES (July 28, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2014/07/28/hague-court-russia-didsteal-yukos-and-must-pay-50-billion-damages/.
128
Jennifer Rankin, Russia Ordered to Pay $50bn in Damages to Yukos Shareholders, GUARDIAN (July
28, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jul/28/russia-order-pay-50bn-yukos-shareholderskhodorkovsky-court.
123
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arbiters ruled that Russia had violated Article 13(1) of the Treaty, thereby
essentially expropriating an industry without providing due
compensation.129 Russia’s Ministry of Finance announced that it would
appeal the decision, which it claimed was politically motivated.130 If Russia
refuses to pay the award, the claimants may pursue Russian sovereign
commercial assets, including those of Gazprom and Rosneft, through courtordered seizures.131 Additionally, the former management of Yukos won an
award of $2.5 billion from the European Court of Human Rights just three
days later.132
While these decisions are a result of a series of legal proceedings
dating back almost a decade, the timing of the judgments is certainly
conspicuous. The arbitration award rendered on July 18, 2014 came just
one day after the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 in eastern
Ukraine.133 The attack, which Russia has been accused of being involved
in, 134 had been the latest escalation in the Ukrainian conflict discussed in
Part E.
D. Proposals for a More Integrated Pipeline Network
Pipeline security poses the most imminent challenge to the Russia–EU
energy trade. Energy shortages caused by pipeline shutdowns in Belarus
and Ukraine not only present a looming threat to the EU’s ability to feel
secure in their energy supply, but also result in substantial lost profits for
129
Final Awards Issued in 3 Arbitrations Between Former Shareholders of Yukos and the Russian
Federation, PERM. CT. OF ARB., http://www.pca-cpa.org/shownews.asp?nws_id=440&pag_id=1261
&ac=view (last visited Aug. 31, 2014). Article 13(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty provides,
“Investments of Investors of a Contracting Party in the Area of any other Contracting Party shall not be
nationalized, expropriated or subjected to a measure or measures having effect equivalent to
nationalization or expropriation . . . except where such Expropriation is: (a) for a purpose which is in the
public interest; (b) not discriminatory; (c) carried out under due process of law; and (d) accompanied by
the payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.” ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, THE
ENERGY CHARTER TREATY AND RELATED DOCUMENTS art. 13, § 1 (2004),
available at
http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/EN.pdf.
130
Russia to Appeal Against $50bn Yukos Shareholder Payout, BBC NEWS (July 28, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28520892.
131
Henry Meyer & Stephen Bierman, Yukos Hunting Rosneft Assets from Venezuela to Vietnam,
BLOOMBERG (July 31, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-30/yukos-hunting-rosneftgazprom-assets-from-venezuela-to-vietnam.html.
132
Gabrielle Steinhauser & Gregory L. White, Russia Must Compensate Yukos Shareholders, Says
European Court, WALL ST. J. (July 31, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/russia-must-compensateyukos-shareholders-says-european-court-1406797417.
133
Malaysian Airliner Crashes in E. Ukraine near Russian Border, 298 People on Board, RT (July
17, 2014), http://rt.com/news/173616-malaysian-crash-ukraine-border/.
134
Greg Miller, U.S. Discloses Intelligence on Downing of Malaysian Jet, WASH. POST (July 22,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-discloses-intelligence-on-downingof-malaysian-jet/2014/07/22/b178fe58-11e1-11e4-98ee-daea85133bc9_story.html.
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Russia. Both parties have a strong interest to mutually plan for pipeline
construction that avoids these volatile and economically depressed
countries.135
The first major pipeline project inaugurated in response to this
problem was the Nord Stream pipeline.136 This pipeline runs underneath
the Baltic Sea and connects Russian suppliers directly with the EU via
Germany.137 The pipeline completed its final planned stage of construction
in August 2012138 although feasibility studies are in the works for a third or
fourth stage of the pipeline in the coming years.139
Access to southern EU member states through new pipelines has
presented a more daunting challenge. Announced in June 2007, the South
Stream connects Russian pipelines directly to southeastern EU member
states through the Black Sea.140 Unlike the Nord Stream, which passes
through only Russian and EU territorial waters, the South Stream pipeline
passes through Turkish territorial waters to avoid further conflicts with
Ukraine, which borders the Black Sea to the north.141 However, the South
Stream pipeline originally competed directly with alternative pipeline
projects through Turkey that bypassed Russia.142 The Trans Anatolian Gas
Pipeline (TANAP) is a planned pipeline project that would transport gas
from Azerbaijan through Turkey to the EU.143 Likewise, the Nabucco
pipeline was proposed to connect gas sources from Azerbaijan, Iraq, Egypt,
and Turkmenistan to the EU through Turkey, thereby delivering gas supply
through the Nabucco-West Pipeline to Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and
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Austria where it could be further branched out to Western Europe.144
Although Russia’s main export competitors for the EU market are Norway,
Algeria, and Qatar, the United States is poised to potentially become a
player in the market as transmission technology is developed to facilitate
transportation.145 Russia therefore has a strong interest in limiting other gas
exporters from entering the EU market and further diluting its market share.
However, both TANAP and the Nabucco pipeline have faced
significant problems in the last year. On June 28, 2013, the Shah Deniz
Consortium, comprised of the major stakeholders of Azeri gas fields,
announced that it would be supplying Europe with gas through the Trans
Adriatic Pipeline project⎯connecting Turkey with Greece, Albania, and
Italy⎯rather than the more expansive Nabucco-West pipeline.146 This
artery will be connected through the TANAP pipeline, but transmission is
not expected to begin until 2018 at the earliest.147
With an obvious need to secure delivery through countries other than
Ukraine or Belarus, Russia and the EU have become even more closely
intertwined through investment in recent pipeline projects.
The
downscaling and failure of pipeline proposals that link the EU with
Russia’s competitors make diversification of energy suppliers even more
difficult. Since the Southern Stream is still in construction and further
pipeline branches to connect the rest of the EU to the Nord Stream and
South Stream are still in their planning stages, if the EU is to move away
from Russian energy dependence, it must do so now. The trigger for the
EU to consider pulling the plug on cementing its dependence on Russian
energy supplies came in the form of unrest in Ukraine.
E. The Ukrainian Revolution
In November 2013, the EU gas supply was projected to be threatened
over the winter by Ukrainian failure to store sufficient gas in its
underground storage facilities.148 Positioning over Ukrainian gas prices
was again at the forefront of this crisis as Russia continued to use gas
pricing as a way to control Ukraine’s political alignment; Gazprom had
144
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indicated its willingness to drop gas prices only if Ukraine abandoned plans
to sign the Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement (the
Association Agreement) and instead signed with the Eurasian Economic
Community customs union.149 This customs union created an EU-style
market between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and had sought Ukrainian
membership since its inception.150 By contrast, the Association Agreement
would have allowed Ukraine access to many EU resources such as the
European Investment Bank, EU regulations, and a pathway to visa-free
movement from Ukraine to the EU.151 While European gas delivery was
not affected, Ukraine stopped all of its import of Russian gas for several
days due to an ongoing debate about payments Gazprom claimed were due
from Ukraine.152
Ukraine suspended negotiations on the Association Agreement with
the EU on November 21, 2013.153 On December 17, the President of
Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, and the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin,
signed a Ukrainian–Russian action plan that provided for Russian
investment in Ukrainian Eurobonds and a subsequent lowering of natural
gas prices to Ukraine.154 Unlike previous exercises of Russian political
influence over Ukraine, this action sparked massive spontaneous protests in
Kiev.155 Such protests were exacerbated and brought to the attention of the
international media when the protestors were violently dispersed by
Ukrainian police forces.156 With the protestors gaining momentum, Prime
Minister Mykola Azarov, one of the strongest pro-Russian voices in the
cabinet, resigned on January 28, 2014.157 Following days of violence and
149
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talks, protestors finally took control of Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, as
President Yanukovych fled to Russia.158 Protestors appointed a new interim
President, immediately released from jail Yulia Tymoshenko, a staunch
political opponent of President Yanukovych, and reverted the Ukrainian
constitution back to the 2004–2010 version (eliminating subsequent
amendments that had allowed Russian to be used in some regions as a
second national language).159
While Ukraine’s interim government has reversed course and is
actively pursuing a pro-EU stance, the relationship between Russia and the
EU has notably soured. In response to the change of government in Kiev,
the Crimean Oblast and Sevastopol (a city with special status under the
Ukrainian constitution), both predominantly Russian-speaking areas, voted
to secede from Ukraine and subsequently held a referendum to join
Russia.160 Meanwhile, the EU joined the United States and Canada in
issuing broad sanctions for officials from Russia, Crimea, and the
Commonwealth of Independent States who were accused of orchestrating
Crimean separatism.161
In response to the Ukrainian Revolution, Russian-speaking and proRussian elements in the eastern Ukrainian cities of Donetsk and Lugansk
declared independence from Ukraine.162 The subsequent conflict between
pro-Russian separatists, allegedly supported by Russian military
elements,163 has been declared a civil war by the Red Cross164 and has
exponentially agitated tensions between Russia and the EU over handling of
the crisis.
Gas interests have remained an important factor in the Ukrainian
crisis. To date, delivery of gas from Russia to the EU through Ukraine has
been unaffected by the crisis.165 However, with tension between Ukraine
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and Russia unlikely to disperse quickly, Russia is looking to expedite
construction on the South Stream pipeline to ensure its transmission
capacity to the EU.166 But the EU has repeatedly threatened to end
cooperation with Russia on the South Stream pipeline,167 adding further
uncertainty to a flailing Russian energy market that was hit hard by EU
sanctions.168
Meanwhile, domestic gas suppliers like Norway have seen a spiked
increase in gas demand resulting from the EU–Russia standoff.169 Without
the pipeline capacity to turn immediately away from Russian energy
dependence in response to these political concerns, the EU and Russia must
independently consider whether the ramifications of continuing such a
political standoff outweigh the economic consequences. For Russia, the
economic consequences are the loss of a stable market for its gas exports.
For the EU, those consequences could include energy shortages.
F. The Chinese Markets
Russia’s export strategy has shifted in response to political conflicts
with the West, leading to a stronger focus on eastern markets like China.170
On May 21, 2014, China signed a deal with Gazprom for an estimated $400
billion to construct a pipeline and deliver about 4 trillion cubic meters per
year of gas to China over the next thirty years.171 On the one hand,
connecting China to Russia’s pipeline system will integrate the eastern and
western gas markets.172 The pipeline, which broke ground on September 1,
2014, is expected to be operational in 2019, providing a direct outlet for
Siberian and Far East gas into China.173 On the other hand, the availability
of China as a large-scale consumer makes Russian gas a more competitive
commodity, breaking the monopsony power of Europe over Russia’s export
market.174
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IV. DISCUSSION
A. Analysis
The Roadmap Agreement envisions the continuation and building of
the current dependence of Europe on Russian natural gas until at least
2050.175 However, there is an inherent disconnect between the EU’s clearly
articulated standards for the EU energy market and the practices and ideals
on which the Gazprom energy market is based upon.
The EU is committed to building a functioning, integrated network
infrastructure and open, transparent, efficient, and competitive markets;
ensuring energy security; and conforming to the goals of sustainable
development.176
To the EU, a functioning, integrated network
infrastructure means working towards the development of a smart grid that
can immediately and sufficiently meet the energy needs of every citizen in
each member state. Open, transparent, efficient, and competitive markets
means the development of a single EU energy market that offers consistent
electricity pricing due to transparent companies engaged in actual
competition for consumers. Energy security means finding a way to ensure
that the EU can avoid the stoppage crises that have occurred when relations
between Russia and Ukraine or Belarus have gone sour, leaving the EU to
suffer the consequences of complete Russian energy dependence. Finally,
sustainable development involves developing an energy policy that will
promote lower carbon emissions and decrease Europe’s contribution to
climate change.
Gazprom, and by virtue of its majority ownership, Russia, are clearly
not in accord with many of these goals. The accusations levied against
Gazprom cite Gazprom’s policy of using “destination clauses” to create
national energy sub-markets for the purpose of discriminatory pricing that
flies directly in the face of the EU goal of a single energy market.
Moreover, the corruption and lack of transparency in Russian energy cartels
has been a consistent problem, and Gazprom fervently resists EU measures
to end such corrupt practices. Russia has never shied away from using gas
prices to incentivize Ukraine and Belarus to act in accordance with Russia’s
wishes, and conversely, Russia has been accused of punishing countries that
act against Russian interests.177
With Russia and the EU demonstrating such diametrically opposed
interests, the EU’s move to sign the Roadmap Agreement before initiating
the recent legal action against Gazprom shows the power of the EU’s
175
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competing goals. Establishing a long-term energy relationship with Russia
through the Roadmap Agreement is an attempt to lock down much needed
energy security. Meanwhile, the legal action shows that the EU is equally
motivated to enforce the standards to which it holds its energy policy. Both
interests have become increasingly acute given the political standoff over
Ukraine. The timely handing down of the Yukos Oil arbitration and
European Court of Human Rights decisions, coupled with the sanctions on
Russian officials over the Crimean and eastern Ukrainian unrest, have
shown that the EU is unwilling to compromise its political interests for its
economic needs. Likewise, Russia’s investment in China and continued
support of pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine has shown Russia’s growing
insecurity over Europe’s consumer power. With these interests in mind,
there are three possible eventualities for the Russian–EU natural gas trade.
B. Potential Outcomes
First, the status quo may prevail. The EU will continue to challenge
the most egregious of Gazprom’s anticompetitive business practices while
Gazprom will continue to innovate new ways of extorting enough profits
from the EU to keep Gazprom profitable. This situation would likely result
in neither party feeling that their goals were met. The EU would not feel
that it achieved energy security because it would constantly fear that any
legal action taken against Gazprom could result in stoppages of gas
deliveries, or that Russia may find a way to utilize the Asian market more
lucratively and abandon the EU’s energy demands. With the outcome of
the Ukrainian unrest still uncertain and alternative pipelines still years from
completion, returning to the status quo seems both unlikely and
increasingly fraught with political conflict.
Second, the EU may prevail and force changes to Gazprom’s business
practices. This possibility also presents severe risks. With Gazprom
avoiding its profit-generating anticompetitive practices, it would have
reduced revenues to make the much-needed increases to production
efficiency to meet the EU demand.178 The EU shares Gazprom’s incentive
to keep the latter profitable and supply the Central and Eastern European
member states with natural gas. The Energy Charter Treaty and the
Roadmap Agreement have attempted to put in place communication
mechanisms to allow for greater cooperation between Russia and EU
consumers, but dispute resolution still too often comes in the form of legal
arbitration or legal action.179 The EU’s hardline stance on legal matters like
178
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the Yukos Oil dispute combined with economic sanctions over the
Ukrainian crisis suggest that the EU still perceives this option as a potential
outcome. However, given the resource imbalance favoring Russia and the
new availability of Chinese markets, the EU’s ability to force this outcome
seems more remote by the day.
Finally, the EU could find another fuel supplier that would meet its
standards and offer fuel in a competitive market. One option for this would
be Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries which require pipeline
construction to begin large scale trade. The Middle East currently has a
marginal share in Europe’s import market, especially for petroleum, while
Central Asia has proposed and lost bids for pipeline access throughout
Europe. If the EU chooses to abandon Russia as its primary import source
for energy, it could look to either of these regions to increase their share.
Alternatively, Europe could increase its use of American coal exports;
however, coal presents its own environmental risks that threaten EU
sustainable development goals. Some have suggested that a future solution
may be United States entry into the LNG export industry.180 LNG is natural
gas that has been supercooled into a liquid state for transportation through
pipelines or shipping.181 Currently, the leading exporters of LNG are Qatar,
Malaysia, Australia, Nigeria, and Indonesia.182 The United States has
become largely self sufficient when it comes to fuel sources for electricity
and is poised to become a net exporter of natural gas within the next four to
five years.183 The United States currently maintains an export ban on
natural gas, but the U.S. Department of Energy is considering some export
licenses which would allow the United States to begin participation in the
LNG export industry.184 For Russia, this would place greater importance on
the new Chinese import market for natural gas. With integration of eastern
and western pipeline systems scheduled for 2019, Russia would be forced
to balance its economic interests in export to both Europe and China with
its disinterest in reforming its internal politics and corporate governance.
In the meantime, the EU must find a way to stabilize its relationship
with Gazprom and Russia to provide energy security, which the soft
commitments of the Roadmap Agreement fail to provide, while bringing
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Gazprom in line with the energy policy the EU has set for the foreseeable
future, which the current action against Gazprom is very unlikely to
achieve. It is still difficult at this juncture to predict the course of the
Russia–EU natural gas trade. What had previously been a stable
relationship of necessity owing to resource imbalance and the captivity of
both buyer and seller has been thrown into flux. The Ukrainian conflict and
the recent legal actions are not the causes of this flux, but rather the result
of shifting markets and economic interests. Even without immediately
available alternatives to Russian gas, the EU has shown its unwillingness to
be completely vulnerable to Russia’s monopoly supplier power, and Russia
has countered with alternatives to the EU’s monopsony consumer power.
Only time will tell who wins this game of chicken.
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